

## DIALOGUE

### Time and Knowledge: Comments on Mainemelis's "When the Muse Takes It All: A Model for the Experience of Timelessness in Organizations"

Professor Mainemelis (2001) has done a great service in opening for discussion the important topic of how time is experienced by organizational actors, and how it might be experienced differently. However, his distinction between ordinary temporal experience on the one hand and timelessness on the other seems too blunt an instrument to achieve his stated aims.

Mainemelis argues that under special conditions our ordinary experience of time as linear gives way to a mode of being in which each moment has timeless depth. He links such "timeless time" to the "flow experience" identified by Csikszentmihalyi (1988); see Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988). These researchers do recognize that flow experience often involves a changed relationship to time, but they offer varying descriptions of what that relationship might be. To characterize it as "timeless" seems to go against the very idea of flow, which suggests change and movement and, thus, a temporal dynamic. Since linear time freezes that dynamic (Hall, 1983; Purser & Petranker, 2002; Tulku, 1994), the challenge is to find ways to unfreeze time, making the temporal dynamic directly available as a constitutive element of experience (Adam & Whipp, 2002; Tulku, 1994). This approach opens up prospects for working with time in organizational settings more realistic, and perhaps ultimately more fruitful, than those offered by Mainemelis.

In practical terms, Mainemelis's list of ten factors that can facilitate the experience of timelessness seems consistently problematic. Consider the four factors relating to work environment: lack of pressure and lack of distractions are a pipe dream for most managers, whereas autonomy and meaningful work are beyond the reach of most employees in most organizations most of the time. Nor is it clear that these factors are reliable predictors for timeless experiences, since flow experiences can apparently also arise in trivial, mundane tasks, and for some individuals they seem to

arise regularly under virtually any circumstances (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988).

The underlying difficulty is that Mainemelis treats timelessness as a mystery (consider his evocation of the muse in the title of the article). Organizations can create conditions that prove conducive to the timeless experience, but whether inspiration will strike remains unpredictable. Indeed, for Mainemelis timelessness is unknowable in principle, since actors engrossed in the timeless state cannot identify it as such without thereby bringing it to a close.

These concerns do not undermine the significance of the phenomena that Mainemelis identifies, but they do speak in favor of shifting the focus from timelessness to the temporal dynamic: the active flow of what is happening, with an emphasis on the "is happening" rather than the "what." Mainemelis offers a good starting point when he links linear time to the self and its emotional states, while attributing timeless experiences to a kind of "self-forgetting." But he takes too narrow a view when he attributes the link between the self and linear time to psychological factors, such as fear of failure and negative judgment.

A more fruitful approach is to explore how the commitment to linear time grows out of the self's epistemological stance (Tulku, 1987). This clears the way for a wide range of potential interventions and research programs, with direct application to the realities of organizational practice. The key question will be whether it is possible to know/experience time—not time's passing, but time's flow—differently (Petranker, 2000; Purser & Petranker, 2002; Tulku, 1994). Although much more work remains to be done, there is already a small but significant body of work suggesting that different epistemological stands produce different relationships to the dynamic of time (Delle Fave & Massimini, 1988; Hall, 1983; cf. Polanyi, 1958).

Building on these beginnings will require a break with the prevailing paradigms for social science research. Third-person forms of inquiry, in which the investigator "here" devises measures for assessing data collected with respect to something or someone over "there," emerge

out of the epistemological stance of a distanced self operating in linear time. Accordingly, they have proved ill suited to investigating other, more dynamic ways of experiencing time (Varela & Shear, 1999). Successful inquiry into the availability, communicability, and effects of nonordinary time within organizational settings will almost certainly require a willingness to draw on the emerging body of postpsychological first-person research methodologies (Petranker, 2001; Varela & Shear, 1999).

As Csikszentmihalyi (1988) notes, individuals who have been able to engage the dynamic of time differently have had a significant impact on the course of human affairs. Speculating, it seems that they could have an equally significant impact within organizations. In an age of temporal turbulence, intrinsically inimical to the timeless experience as Mainemelis has described it (see his Proposition 12), such capacities demand further inquiry. We can thank Mainemelis for taking an important first step in this direction.

## REFERENCES

- Adam, B., & Whipp, R. 2002. *Making time*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1988. The future of flow. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), *Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness*: 364-383. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Csikszentmihalyi, I. S. (Eds.). 1988. *Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Delle Fave, A., & Massimini, F. 1988. Modernization and the changing contexts of flow in work and leisure. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), *Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness*: 193-213. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, E. 1983. *The dance of life: The other dimension of time*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Mainemelis, C. 2001. When the muse takes it all: A model for the experience of timelessness in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 26: 548-565.
- Petranker, J. 2000. *Does consciousness flow? And why it matters*. Available online at [www.creativeinquiry.org/fields-of-inquiry/](http://www.creativeinquiry.org/fields-of-inquiry/).
- Petranker, J. 2001. Who shall be the scientists? *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 8(11): 83-90.
- Polanyi, M. 1958. *Personal knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Purser, R., & Petranker, J. 2002. *From causal time to flow time: Toward a future-centered theory of change management*. Paper accepted for presentation at the Western Academy of Management Conference, Santa Fe, NM.
- Tulku, T. 1987. *Love of knowledge*. Berkeley, CA: Dharma.
- Tulku, T. 1994. *Dynamics of time and space: Transcending the limits on knowledge*. Berkeley, CA: Dharma.
- Varela, F., & Shear, J. 1999. *The view from within: First-person approaches to the study of consciousness*. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.

Jack Petranker  
Center for Creative Inquiry



## Timelessness and Nonephemeral Knowledge

In my recent article on timelessness and creativity (Mainemelis, 2001), I propose a theoretical framework of subjective time experience and a descriptive model of the dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of timelessness. In his commentary on my article, Jack Petranker misunderstands and misinterprets several key points in my model and the supporting literature.

First, Petranker objects to my suggestion that individuals experience timelessness in the more complex levels of the flow state, and he counterproposes that the "very idea of flow . . . suggests change and movement and, thus, a temporal dynamic." The problem in this misleading statement is the unexamined "thus." Consciousness flows, but it does not flow in time. Consciousness flows by enveloping apprehended states that permeate each other, and it creates the notion of time by separating them into distinct states that succeed one another (Bergson, 1960). The dynamic of time is not intrinsic to the change event but to the observer's experience of the event (Bergson, 1911; Maturana, 1995; Ornstein, 1970). As the distinction between observer and event collapses during the complex levels of the flow state (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), the experience of time is suspended and the experience of flow is activated. Individuals sometimes offer varying descriptions of this experience, because they articulate it always in retrospect (Gardner, 1993). I am not alone in these conclusions: "Generally in flow we forget time, and hours may pass by in what seems like a few minutes" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997: 113; emphasis added). "We evaluate duration according to the retrospective contents of conscious-

ness. . . . [If] a great deal of information is processed, we are unconscious of time, which seems therefore to fly by" (Pöppel, 1988: 88; emphasis added).

Petranker also treats time pressures as the objective characteristic of the work environment that makes the experience of timelessness impossible. Ironically, even his intellectual affiliations (e.g., Tulku, 1994) suggest that what matters in temporality is how individuals subjectively experience it and transform it. Perlow (1999) writes that the time famine in organizations is perpetuated by a set of social cognitions, which reinforce its enactment and the perception that managerial work is done under pressures and distractions. Deadlines are used to structure and coordinate work, and work is overpriced and overcompensated when accomplished against tough deadlines. Most interventions attempting to help companies deal with the time famine generate a demand for interventions that deal with the time famine, and in doing so, they contribute to the causes of the problem whose effects they purport to alleviate. Our role is not to firefight these problems but to directly question the validity and generalizability of the taken-for-granted beliefs of conventional wisdom: Is it really true that the workplace is *always* the house of temporal madness?

In their article in the *AMR* special topic forum on time, Blount and Janicik (2001) begin with assumptions that are very different from mine. Yet they argue that "perceiving absolute time is not an innate human capability" (2001: 566), and they conclude that the relevance of the increasing perception of the time famine "to the individual's experience of time is somewhat ephemeral" and "malleable" (2001: 580). In my article I argue that humans do not have the innate capability of perceiving absolute time because absolute time does not exist, and I suggest that there are finite states of total involvement in one's work that allow individuals to transcend organizational sociotemporality and experience timelessness. In the end, the validity of the theory-driven model I propose should be determined by a series of rigorous empirical tests and not by a series of atheoretical prescriptive speculations.

The above illustrate two central arguments in my article. The first is that subjective experience has immediate, intrinsic, and universal elements that are not subject to the a priori interpretative mechanisms of cultural, social, and

organizational cognitions (Bergson, 1911; Kolb, 1984; Richards, 1999). The second is that timelessness as a nonrandom experience is intrinsically motivated, a context of engagement resulting from an individual's taking control over the quality of his or her own subjective experience, by perceiving flexibly, and by making the most of what the circumstances offer (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). I write that the work environment facilitates or hinders but does not completely determine timelessness, and I do clarify that what matters in conditions like time pressures or autonomy is how individuals *perceive them* (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Shalley, Gilson, & Blum, 2000).

Petranker argues that autonomy and meaningful work are beyond the reach of most people in most organizations most of the time. Given that my dependent variable is creativity, I would say that organizations that facilitate autonomy and meaningful work foster creativity (Amabile et al., 1996; Isaksen, Lauer, Ekvall, & Britz, 2001; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley et al., 2000), and those organizations that inhibit such conditions should not be told comforting stories about the "realities of organizational practice" Petranker is talking about but, rather, the truth about what fosters and what hinders creativity (see Amabile, 1998, and Nemeth, 1997).

Further, and since Petranker takes issue with the "impersonal" character of social research, I would remind him of the example of Albert Einstein, who, after several failed attempts at securing an academic position, obtained a job in a patent office. When someone told him that this job would probably be boring, Einstein wrote, "Certain people find everything boring—I am sure that I will find it very nice and I will be grateful . . . as long as I live" (quoted in Miller, 1999: 645). Seven years later, Einstein had published fifty articles that defined a scientific revolution. During these seven years, he raised a family and worked in the patent office six days a week, eight hours a day (Miller, 1999), sometimes dealing with patents and sometimes creating opportunities for complete immersion in the work that he loved (Gardner, 1993). Individuals have historically been able to reach states of total involvement in their work not only under the sun of the blissful islands but also under lukewarm, adverse, or even appalling conditions (Amabile, 1996: 8; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990;

Logan, 1988; May, 1994). To miss this point is to miss the whole point of what timelessness is.

While the world of work as we know it is a product of the past century, people's experiences of immersion in their work have a recorded history of almost three millennia. I use the word "muse" in the title of my article to convey that long before, far beyond, and especially hidden within the currently dominant organizational mindsets we may discover experiential contexts that collapse the distinctions "work versus play" and "effort versus enjoyment." There is nothing mysterious, mystical, or mythical in the psychological origin, structure, and function of these experiences. From a biocultural perspective, individuals are motivated not only by the needs of survival and reproduction but also by the need to re-create optimal experiences, such as timelessness, flow, play, or the sense of beauty (Massimini & Delle Fave, 2000; Richards, 1999). They are "optimal" not only because they are enjoyable but also because they facilitate an arsenal of highly sophisticated processes, such as learning, mastery, and creativity, which are useful to individuals and organizations (Nicholson, 2000; Richards, 1999; Russ, 1993; Santayana, 1955; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).

Unfortunately, timelessness scores very low on Petranker's checklist of practical, readily applicable, and on-demand topics of organizational inquiry. In my opinion, scholarship is not a popularity contest, nor is it an unconditional submission to the ephemeral and the prêt-à-porter. A robust scientific discipline possesses both the reflexive ability to effectively respond to society's pressing demands and an intrinsic interest in exploring the nonephemeral and aeonian experiences and quests of individuals. Would you be surprised if individuals continued to seek total involvement in attractive activities long after organizations, as we know them today, were gone?

## REFERENCES

- Amabile, T. M. 1996. *Creativity in context*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Amabile, T. M. 1998. How to kill creativity. *Harvard Business Review*, 76(5): 76-87.
- Amabile, T. M., Conti, R., Coon, H., Lazenby, J., & Herron, M. 1996. Assessing the work environment for creativity. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39: 1154-1184.
- Bergson, H. 1911. *Creative evolution*. (Translated by A. Mitchell.) New York: Henry Holt.
- Bergson, H. 1960. (First published in 1910.) *Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness*. (Translated by F. L. Pogson.) New York: Harper & Row.
- Blount, S., & Janicik, G. A. 2001. When plans change: Examining how people evaluate timing changes in work organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 26: 566-585.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. *Flow: The psychology of optimal experience*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1997. *Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Gardner, H. 1993. *Creating minds*. New York: Basic Books.
- Isaksen, S. G., Lauer, K. J., Ekvall, G., & Britz, A. 2001. Perceptions of the best and worst climates for creativity: Validation evidence for the situational outlook questionnaire. *Creativity Research Journal*, 13: 171-184.
- Kolb, D. A. 1984. *Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning of development*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Logan, R. 1988. Flow in solitary ordeals. In M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. S. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), *Optimal experience: Psychological studies of flow in consciousness*: 172-180. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainemelis, C. 2001. When the muse takes it all: A model for the experience of timelessness in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 26: 548-565.
- Massimini, F., & Delle Fave, A. 2000. Individual development in a bio-cultural perspective. *American Psychologist*, 55: 24-33.
- Maturana, H. R. 1995. *On the nature of time*. Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Terapia Cognitiva.
- May, R. 1994. (First published in 1975.) *The courage to create*. New York: Norton.
- Miller, A. I. 1999. Albert Einstein. In M. A. Runco & S. R. Pritzker (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of creativity*, vol. 1: 643-646. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Nemeth, C. J. 1997. Managing innovation: When less is more. *California Management Review*, 40(1): 59-74.
- Nicholson, N. 2000. *Executive instinct: Managing the human animal in the information age*. New York: Crown Publishers.
- Oldham, G. R., & Cummings, A. 1996. Employee creativity: Personal and contextual factors at work. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39: 607-634.
- Ornstein, R. E. 1970. *On the experience of time*. New York: Penguin.
- Perlow, L. A. 1999. The time famine: Toward a sociology of work time. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44: 57-81.
- Pöppel, E. 1988. *Mindworks: Time and conscious experience*. (Translated by T. Artin.) Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Richards, R. 1999. The subtle attraction: Beauty as a force in

- awareness, creativity, and survival. In S. W. Russ (Ed.), *Affect, creative experience, and psychological adjustment*: 195-219. Philadelphia: Brunner/Mazel.
- Russ, S. W. 1993. *Affect and creativity: The role of affect and play in the creative process*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Santayana, G. 1955. (First published in 1896.) *The sense of beauty*. New York: Dover.
- Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. 2000. Positive psychology: An introduction. *American Psychologist*, 55: 5-14.
- Shalley, C. E., Gilson, L. L., & Blum, T. C. 2000. Matching creativity requirements and the work environment: Effects on satisfaction and intentions to leave. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43: 215-223.
- Tulku, T. 1994. *Dynamics of time and space: Transcending the limits on knowledge*. Berkeley, CA: Dharma.

Charalampos Mainemelis  
London Business School



### The Importance of Time in Organizational Research

An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come (from Victor Hugo's *Histoire d'un Crime*, 1852, conclusion).

Consistent with Hugo's quote, the recent (October 2001) *AMR* special issue devoted to time and organizational research is definitely an idea whose time has come. Of late, the management discipline increasingly has been criticized as being, among other things, trivial, irrelevant, and simple minded (e.g., see Kilduff & Mehra, 1997, and Wright & Wright, 2000). Taken together, and developed as one attempt to address these criticisms, the special issue articles well articulate the need to advance our theoretical understanding of the role of time (and timing) in applied research. For instance, Mitchell and James (2001) adopt as their thesis the basic premise that while time *lags* between the study variables and the actual *duration* or *stability* of the variables themselves are of critical theoretical concern, they are typically given, at best, minimal consideration in organizational research. In addition, the Mitchell and James article differs from the other special issue articles in that the authors propose that time be made explicit in all organizational research endeavors, irrespective of the primary focus of the research. However, while I agree with the authors' admo-

dition to make time explicit in our research endeavors, their proposal is not without significant consequence. To that end, the purpose of this dialogue is to briefly elaborate and extend upon their theoretical premise and introduce several relevant practical and methodological implications/concerns with making time explicit in applied research.

Mitchell and James accurately note that "any inference involving the existence of an X,Y relationship or its strength is dependent upon when X and Y are believed to occur and when they are measured" (2001: 530). They further propose that the failure to undertake this safeguard "poses serious problems for the evolution and acceptance of our field" (2001: 530). As a case in point, consider the research undertaken by Helmreich, Sawin, and Carsrud (1986) to examine the effects of personality on job performance over time in a repeated measures design. It is interesting to note that while the relation between personality and job performance was not significant after three months, the relation was significant after both six and eight months. Helmreich et al. (1986) labeled this delayed effect impact of personality on performance the *honeymoon effect*.

In order to explain this and other similar findings, many researchers have proposed the existence of any number of basic ability factors as accounting for much of the job performance variance early on. Later on, it is presumed that the personality or well-being of the employee comes to assume a more significant role in performance prediction (Wright, 1997). In actuality, and in violation of Mitchell and James' clarion call for a well-articulated theory development pertaining to time, Helmreich et al. cannot theoretically justify their time choices (three, six, and eight months) as appropriate periods to measure job performance. Two studies of mine further highlight the need to make time explicit.

In Wright and Bonett (1992), we demonstrated that the type of employee turnover predicted changes in subsequent employee psychological well-being. Employees who changed both job and occupation showed greater improvement in well-being than employees who only changed jobs or employees who remained in their initial jobs. The measurement design was primarily predicated upon turnover data supplied by the particular organization examined. Since administrative personnel estimated the average annual turnover rate at roughly 15 to 20 percent, the length of the study was arbitrarily set by me

at two years, with measurements of well-being taken every six months to "ensure that a sufficient number of employees would have withdrawn from their initial job" (1992: 606).

In a second study, Cropanzano and Wright (1999), we examined the relation between psychological well-being and job performance over a five-year time period. Consistent with the expectation of diminishing association, we found that the well-being-performance relation was influenced by the actual time interval between assessment of well-being and assessment of performance. When well-being was measured at the same time as performance, or as long as one year before, the two variables were significantly associated. However, when well-being was assessed 4.5 or 5 years before job performance, the relation was no longer significant.

These two longitudinal designs were primarily implemented for pragmatic reasons. In fact, in Cropanzano and Wright we noted that "practical considerations dictate the unequal [time] intervals" (1999: 256). Specifically, the initial study was designed to obtain assessments of the well-being-performance relation every six months for five years. However, regarding implementation of the initial study design, there was administrative turnover at the CEO level midway through the research project. The new administration's initial response was to put any further collection of the data on "temporary" hold. In fact, only after polite but persistent subsequent requests by me were we allowed to complete the project at years 4.5 and 5, as initially agreed.

While I agree with Mitchell and James that pragmatism should not be considered a sufficient condition in actual research design, as these examples indicate, pragmatism does drive design in much organizational research, whether cross-sectional or longitudinal in nature (cf. Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). As a consequence, it is highly probable that far different results would be obtained depending on precisely when the variable measurements were taken. Relatedly, Mitchell and James further note that one's obtained results are also a function of the level of variable stability or consistency over time.

Regarding the issue of variable stability, Mitchell and James propose that since variables are subject to change over time, it is incumbent upon organizational researchers to ascertain the actual rate of change. Using our psychological well-being measure as an example, this means that for both theoretical and practical rea-

sons, it is necessary to distinguish among the actual sources of variable change. For instance, one possible explanation for the Cropanzano and Wright (1999) finding that the effect of well-being on job performance decreased as the time lag between variable assessment increased involves the level of variable stability attributable to the actual traits or dispositions themselves.

Despite the widespread conceptualization of variables like psychological well-being as traits, researchers such as Newton and Keenan (1991) have noted that research investigating the temporal effects of dispositional or trait variables is often plagued by a number of potentially serious methodological problems. In the present example, while psychological well-being has been considered as both a disposition or trait and a state or mood, most typically it is viewed as a consistent and stable trait. However, to date, the exact temporal demarcation between state and trait components (i.e., hour[s], day[s], week[s], month[s], year[s], etc.) is far from clearcut. Fortunately, the preliminary basis for a more precise, temporally based distinction between state and trait can be derived from personality theory (Pervin, 1989).

Personality researchers typically consider person characteristics as dispositional or trait-like if they have consistency or continuity over the longer term (i.e., six months at a minimum) and if they are capable of influencing subsequent behavior. To date, the vast majority of dispositionally based research attempts to "prove" temporal stability have been naively based on correlational analysis. However, psychometricians have long noted the inadequacy of this approach (cf. Kristof, 1963). In particular, Newton and Keenan demonstrated that significant correlations cannot, solely at face value, be taken as sufficient proof of variable stability because the correlations "reveal only the relative, not absolute, positions of individuals in a group" (1991: 781). That is, while high retest correlations do indicate a similarity in score ranking, they cannot be solely used to confirm the absence of absolute change, or stability. As a result, Newton and Keenan, among others, note that correlational analysis should always be supplemented with an assessment of possible changes in mean (and variance) variable levels to infer the presence or absence of temporal dispositional effects.

An examination of recent issues of our leading empirically based management journals (cf. *Academy of Management Journal*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, and *Journal of Management*) indicates that the Mitchell and James admonition to establish variable temporal stability is far from being operationalized adequately in practice.<sup>1</sup> To be more specific, my preliminary review identified an extremely limited number of recent articles (I actually found only one article from 1999) that undertook to establish both relative (retest correlational analysis) and absolute (change in variable mean and variance) stability. Assuming that similar findings are obtained across a range of organizational topics, the obvious conclusion is that Mitchell and James are all too correct in their assessment that issues involving time or timing are typically accorded secondary roles in organizational research, either as moderating variables or merely as an afterthought. I close this dialogue with a brief discussion of one possible consequence of making time explicit in our research.

Mitchell and James note that the field of management has changed significantly with respect to analysis, design, and theory. Regarding theory development, the authors propose that the notions of variable cycles, rhythms, spirals, and oscillation will require making the consideration of time more specific as well as explicit. One immediate result of operationalizing an explicit role of time in our research will involve a greatly diminished role (if not the total elimination) of both cross-sectional and non-time-based longitudinal research designs (taken together, at least 90 percent of our published research). Arguably, the proliferation of these types of research designs, coupled with the consequent neglect of time, is a major reason that our research is all too often described as "trivial, insignificant, and nothing but common sense" (Mitchell & James, 2001: 544). Of course, one very practical

and significant consequence of these research designs is that they greatly help management faculty obtain tenure, promotion, and national visibility. Thus, while Mitchell and James are correct in noting that "we can and should do better" (200: 545), Kerr summarizes my thoughts best when he wrote the classic "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B." One thing is certain—time will certainly tell.

## REFERENCES

- Bonett, D. G., & Wright, T. A. 2000. Sample size requirements for estimating Pearson, Kendall and Spearman correlations. *Psychometrika*, 65: 23-28.
- Cropanzano, R., & Wright, T. A. 1999. A 5-year study of change in the relationship between well-being and job performance. *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research*, 51: 252-265.
- Helmreich, R. L., Sawin, L. L., & Carsrud, A. L. 1986. The honeymoon effect in job performance: Temporal increases in the predictive power of achievement motivation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71: 185-188.
- Kerr, S. 1975. On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. *Academy of Management Journal*, 18: 769-783.
- Kilduff, M., & Mehra, A. 1997. Postmodernism and organizational research. *Academy of Management Review*, 22: 453-481.
- Kristof, W. 1963. The statistical theory of stepped-up reliability coefficients when a test has been divided into several equivalent parts. *Psychometrika*, 28: 121-138.
- Mitchell, T. R., & James, L. R. 2001. Building better theory: Time and the specification of when things happen. *Academy of Management Review*, 26: 530-547.
- Newton, T., & Keenan, T. 1991. Further analyses of the dispositional argument in organizational behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 76: 781-787.
- Pervin, L. J. 1989. *Personality: Theory and research*. New York: Wiley.
- Wright, T. A. 1997. Time revisited in organizational research. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 18: 201-204.
- Wright, T. A., & Bonett, D. G. 1992. The effect of turnover on work satisfaction and mental health: Support for a situational perspective. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 13: 603-615.
- Wright, T. A., & Cropanzano, R. 1998. Emotional exhaustion as a predictor of job performance and voluntary turnover. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83: 486-493.
- Wright, T. A., & Wright, V. P. 2000. How our "values" influence the manner in which organizational research is framed and interpreted. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21: 603-607.

<sup>1</sup> While beyond the scope of this dialogue, interval estimation also may be appropriate in helping to establish more accurate estimates of variable temporal stability. For example, although hypothesis testing is common in time-relevant research, Bonett and Wright (2000) demonstrated that interval estimation procedures may be more appropriate in applications, such as those concerned with establishing temporal stability, where the magnitude of a correlation is of primary interest.

Thomas A. Wright  
University of Nevada at Reno